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CIVIL RIGHTS: A NEW PUBLIC ACCOMMODA-
TIONS LAW FOR OHIO 
WILLIAM w. VAN ALSTYNE* 
For the first time in the twentieth century, the Ohio Legislature 
has moved forcefully to protect the right of access to places of public 
accommodation from racial discrimination.1 In one sense new leg-
islation would seem to be wholly unnecessary, for denial of access 
to places of public accommodation has constituted a civil and criminal 
offense in Ohio ever since the legislature acted in 18842 to fill the 
gap created by the Civil Rights Cases.3 But a survey by the Ohio 
Civil Rights Commission of seventeen cities in 1960 indicated that 
access to thirty-six kinds of public facilities-from inns through thea-
ters-was commonly denied to many Ohio residents.4 A review of the 
old public accommodations act disclosed a number of basic defects in 
the law itselfG and a most conspicuous sign of the law's disrepair was 
evident in the skepticism of minority groups. They had turned from 
legalistic appeals to the courts based on codified law to extralegal 
self-help, i.e., direct nonviolent persuasion such as sit-ins and pick-
eting.6 
Whether the current legislative effort will recapture the confi-
dence of those it is principally designed to protect and whether it will 
encourage the voluntary abatement of sit-ins in Ohio are political 
questions beyond anyone's capacity to predict. The purpose of this 
comment is merely to review what the law provides, and to anticipate 
certain unresolved problems which the Civil Rights Commission must 
soon confront. Essentially, the 104th General Assembly has integrated 
the public accommodations law with the remedial provisions of the 
Fair Employment Practices Act of 1959. Without discarding criminal 
and civil remedies already available under Section 2901.35 of the Ohio 
Revised Code, the new law provides for relief in the alternative, com-
* Associate Professor of Law, Ohio State University. 
1 Ohio Rev. Code §§ 4112.01-.08 (Supp. 1959), as amended by H.B. 918 (1961). 
2 81 Ohio Laws 15 (1884). 
3 109 u.s. 3 (1883). 
4 Ohio Civil Rights Comm'n, Discrimination in Public Accommodations in Ohio, 
(multi!. Dec. 1960). 
u Van Alstyne, "A Critique of the Ohio Public Accommodations Law," 22 Ohio St. 
L.J. 201 (1961). 
a E.g., the several stand-ins held at the Coney Island Amusement Park near 
Cincinnati; demonstrations at a Columbus skating rink from which three law suits 
resulted. 
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mencing with the filing of a verified charge by a complainant.7 Upon 
receipt of a complaint describing an unlawful instance of discrimin-
ation in a place of public accommodation, the Commission is obliged 
to conduct a preliminary investigation8 which is to determine the suf-
ficiency of the charge. Where probable cause is established, the Com-
mission must attempt through informal conciliation to persuade the 
respondent proprietor to alter his policy to conform with the law. No 
publicity is to accompany any part of these proceedings, and thus both 
parties may initially be insulated from unwanted public attention. 
Should conciliation attempts fail, the case must proceed to a formal 
hearing in which the Attorney General shall present the State's evi-
dence,9 all indispensable parties shall be joined, and all interested 
parties may be heard at the discretion of the Commission. If the 
7 The requirement of a complainant represents a departure from the self-initiatory 
power entrusted to the Commission for the purpose of investigating employment 
discrimination. Ohio Rev. Code § 4112.05(B), as amended by H.B. 918 (1961). The 
legislature evidently felt that the risk of reprisal by employers which might discourage 
employees from filing complaints had no parallel in the field of public accommodations. 
That the "complainant" need not himself be the victim of discrimination, however, may 
be inferred from the provisions that the complaint may be directed against discriminatory 
practices in general (§ 4112.05[B]), that relief is to be granted when discrimination 
"whether against the complainant or others" has been proved (§ 4112.05[G]), that the 
complainant shall be a party to the proceeding apart from others who may be 
"indispensable part(ies)" (§ 4112.05[!]), and that "complainant" is not otherwise 
limited in the section setting forth definitions with greater particularity (§ 4112.01). 
8 The Commission's investigative power has not been specifically defined, and some 
question exists as to whether it extends to a right to inspect premises pursuant to a 
court order but without the employer's or entrepreneur's consent, and whether it includes 
the power to subpoena records. Because the Commission is required to make investiga-
tions and cannot proceed to a hearing unless it finds that discrimination probably exists, 
the right to inspect premises at reasonable hours and under judicial supervision, and to 
subpoena records, may necessarily be implied, especially since the Commission's enforce-
ment power is not penal. In the only instance of a challenge to the Commission's power 
to inspect premises, the employer relented when the Commission announced its intention 
to secure a court order. A fully analogous general power to investigate was held 
sufficient to imply specific authority to subpoena payroll, membership, bank, tax and 
membership meeting records to determine whether respondent was in fact operating a 
bona fide private club, in Sun and Splash Club v. DAD, 3 Race Rei. L. Rep. 726 
(Super. Ct. N.J. 1957) (1958). 
9 Ohio Rev. Code § 4112.05(B), codifies a rule previously adopted by the Com-
mission pursuant to Ohio Rev. Code § 4112.04(A) (4). Committee debate, of which there 
is no official record, indicated that the provision for the Attorney General to present the 
case was adopted in an effort to separate the judicial function of the Commission from 
its executive function. The effort is unavailing, however, for the Commission still is 
charged with receiving and investigating complaints, and with determining whether 
probable cause exists to proceed to a formal hearing; whatever danger previously 
existed that the Commission acting in its executive capacity will prejudice its neutrality 
during the formal hearing lingers on. 
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Commission determines that the respondent has unlawfully discrim-
inated, it shall issue a cease and desist order enforceable through con-
tempt proceedings in a court of common pleas sitting without a jury. 
Either principal party affected by a Commission order is entitled to 
appeal to a court of common pleas for judicial determination that the 
Commission's findings of fact are or are not supported by substantial 
evidence on the record considered as a whole; "legal conclusions" 
presumably are to be reviewed independently by the court. In com-
parison with the older remedies of section 2901.35, the advantages 
of these provisions become self-evident/0 although some may regret 
that a proprietor is allowed a "free first bite," and others may mourn 
the substitution of administrative relief for more traditional judicial 
techniques. Nevertheless, the use of administrative agencies in the 
field of civil rights is increasingly common.11 Generally, they have 
discharged their duties in a satisfactory manner even from a reason-
ably conservative perspective.12 
The 1961 amendments increased the law's coverage in several 
other respects: The class of protected persons has been enlarged by 
substituting "any person" for "citizen," and defining "person" so as 
to include international students, formal and informal associations, 
and tourists-thus removing the ambiguity of the older law which 
may have been limited to the protection of individual Ohio residents; 
discrimination now includes discriminatory acts based on religious 
and ancestral animus, as well as those based on race or color; and 
finally, the legislature has defined discrimination to include segre-
gation, removing the doubt which prevailed under section 2901.35.13 
None of these changes represent any radical departure from recent 
legislative policy, because all are fully analogous to provisions already 
adopted in the F.E.P. legislation of 1959.14 
Certain questions have not been clearly settled by the new law, 
however, and something may be added to an otherwise prosaic sum-
mary of the law by examining them here. The most important of 
10 Van Alstyne, supra note 5, at 209-12. 
11 For reference to the laws of twenty-six states affecting discrimination in places 
of public accommodation, see Greenberg, Race Relations and American Law 375-79 
(1959). See also Emerson and Habor, Political and Civil Rights in the United States 
1408-09, 1413 at n.1; Governor's Comm'n on Human Rights, Report on State Laws and 
Agencies for Civil Rights (multi! Wis. 1960). For recent developments in Idaho, Nevada, 
West Virginia, Washington, Indiana, North Dakota, and Oregon, see 6 Race Rei. L. 
Rep. 630-650 (1961). 
12 Note, 74 Harv. L. Rev. 526 (1961). 
13 See Van Alstyne, supra note 5, at 206-07 (1961), and Ohio Rev. Code § 4112.01 
(G), defining discrimination so as to include segregation. 
14 Ohio Rev. Code §§ 4112.01-.08 (Supp. 1959). 
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these relates to the class of public accommodations which is subject 
to the law's proscriptions. In this respect, the legislature seemingly 
did no more than to carry over bodily the same description as ap-
peared in the earlier law: 
"Place of public accommodation" means any inn, restaurant, eat-
ing house, barbershop, public conveyance by air, land, or water, 
theater, store, or other place for the sale of merchandise, or any 
other place of public accommodation or amusement, where the 
accommodation, advantages, facilities or privileges thereof are 
available to the public. 
In declining to follow the precedent of New York15 and the 
suggestion of the Ohio Civil Rights Commission16 to list comprehen-
sively all the types of business establishments to which the law shall 
apply, the legislature has repeated its earlier formula of using a 
merely illustrative list of establishments followed by an undefined 
omnibus clause. It is clear even from judicial construction of the 
omnibus clause as it appeared in section 2901.35 that the list is not 
to be considered exclusive.17 However, the courts otherwise took a 
15 N.Y. Civ. Rights Law§ 40; J:'f.Y. Exec. L. Art. 12, §§ 290-301 (1959). 
16 Ohio Civil Rights Comm'n, supra note 4, at 49-50: 
(c) "Places of public accommodation" shall include but shall not be limited 
to: 
(1) inns, hotels, motels, hostels, trailer courts, camps, parks, lodges, resorts, 
and other establishments conducted for the recreation, rest, health, or entertain-
ment of transient persons; 
(2) restaurants, drive-ins, cafes, dining rooms, lunch counters, soda foun-
tains, buffets, taverns, road houses, barrooms, saloons, and other establishments 
where prepared foods, beverages, ice cream, or spiritous or malt liquors are 
sold for consumption whether on or off the premises; 
(3) theatres, motion picture houses and drive-ins, auditoriums, stadiums, 
arenas, music halls, dance halls, roof gardens, golf courses, race tracks, bowling 
alleys, skating rinks, billiard and pool parlors, swimming pools, shooting gal-
leries, fairs, carnivals, circuses, rodeos, amusement parks, and other establish-
ments conducted for amusement, recreation, or entertainment; 
(4) buses, taxis, limousines, rail cars, airplanes, ships, and other commercial 
carriers, terminals, stations, waiting rooms, rest rooms, ticket offices, travel 
agencies and all facilities appurtenant to transportation establishment for land, 
sea, or air travel; 
(5) retail stores and other retail outlets, wholesale and discount houses, 
warehouses, auctions, service establishments, parking lots, garages, service 
stations, and other enterprises engaged in the sale, rental, repair or servicing 
of merchandise, clothes, equipment, food, or other goods, whether on business 
premises or not; 
(6) barber shops, beauty parlors, bathhouses, reducing salons, and other 
establishments conducted for the health, appearance, and physical improve-
ment of persons; 
(7) dispensaries, clinics, hospitals, convalescent homes, and other institu-
tions for the physically infirm, cemeteries, crematories, and similar establish-
ments. 
17 Places of public accommodation within the omnibus clause of Ohio Rev. Code 
§ 2901.35 include: a private amusement park, Fletcher v. Coney Island, 54 Ohio Op. 
112, rev'd on other grounds, 165 Ohio St. 150, 134 N.E.2d 371 (1956); a golf course, 
Gillespie v. Lake Short Golf Club, Inc., 56 Ohio L. Abs. 222, 91 N.E.2d 290 (Ct. App. 
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narrow view of "other place of public accommodation,ms but it does 
not follow that the Commission should feel bound by this history. 
Unlike section 2901.35, the new law is simply an amendment to 
the F.E.P. law and thus becomes subject to the legislative admonition 
of section 4112.06 that it "shall be construed liberally for the accom-
plishment of the purposes thereof and any law inconsistent with any 
provision hereof shall not apply." With this expression of legislative 
purpose, the Commission has greater license to depart from the pre-
sumption that statutes in derogation of the common law are to be 
narrowly interpreted.19 Similarly, because relief by the Commission 
extends only to a cease and desist order rather than to fine and im-
prisonment as under section 2901.35, there is no occasion to confine 
construction by characterizing the statute as penal20 rather than re-
medial. 21 Thus, the stronger argument is that the legislature employed 
the omnibus phrase liberally so as virtually to absorb the whole list 
of establishments noted in the Commission's Report. The list may 
not have been incorporated literally as a matter of political strategy, 
in order to keep adversely affected, special interest groups from not-
ing their specific inclusion early enough to lobby against the bill. 
Nevertheless, it is equally clear that the public accommodations 
law cannot be used as a carte blanche by the Commission to trench 
upon every form of discrimination, as by a homeowner or a garden 
club. Some specific guide should surely be observed. In an article 
reviewing the scope of California's old public accommodations law, 
Professor Harold Horowitz has provided the Ohio Commission with 
just such a guide.22 In defining a "place of public accommodation," 
Professor Horowitz strikes a reasonable balance between the com-
peting interests of those seeking access and service, and those in the 
position of entrepreneur, by drawing a line to include establishments in 
a place open to a substantial public where the relationship is ordinarily 
1950); a bowling alley, Johnson v. Humphrey Pop Corn Co., 4 Ohio C.C.R. (n.s.) 49, 
14 Ohio C.C. Dec. 135 (1902); a dance hall, Anderson v. Ohio, 29 Ohio Ct. App. 61, 40 
Ohio C.C.R. (n.s.) (1918); a motion picture theater, Guy v. Tri-State Amusement Co., 
28 Ohio Ct. App. 231 (1917). 
18 See, e.g., Harvey v. Sissie, 53 Ohio App. 405, 5 N.E.2d 410 (1936); Deuwell v. 
Foerster, 12 Ohio N.P. (n.s.) 329, 30 Ohio Dec. 510 (C.P. Franklin Co. 1912). 
19 See Fletcher v. Coney Island, 165 Ohio St. 150, 134 N.E.2d 371 (1956). 
20 Ibid. See cases cited supra, note 18; Rice v. Rinaldo, 44 Ohio Op. 28, 95 N.E.2d 
30 (C.P. 1950), afj'd, 67 Ohio L. Abs. 183, 119 N.E.2d 657 (Ct. App. 1951); Uhlman v. 
Sherman, 22 Ohio N.P. (n.s.) 225, 31 Ohio Dec. 54 (C.P. 1919); Tate v. Eidelman, 32 
Ohio N.P. (n.s.) 478 (C.P. 1934). 
21 For a similar view of Ohio Rev. Code § 2901.35, see the lower courts opinion in 
the Coney Island case, supra note 17, at 117. 
22 Horowitz, "The California Equal Rights Statute," 33 So. Cal. L. Rev. 360 (1960). 
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temporary, sporadic, nonsocial, impersonal, and nongratuitous. Soda 
fountains, bowling alleys, swimming pools, travel agencies, business 
schools, beauty parlors, clinics, and transient housing are easily in-
cluded. By the same gesture, it is arguable that the more enduring, 
less public, and more confidential relationship between doctor and 
patient, or attorney and client, is not contemplated, even though such 
services may be available to the general public on a nongratuitous 
basis, and even though the interest in obtaining such service may be 
high. 
Similarly, it would take an utter stranger to the Ohio legislature 
to construe their purpose as reaching permanent housing. Thus, while 
hotels, motels, daily rental units, camps, and trailer courts are rea-
sonably included, it is doubtful whether lessors and homeowners are. 
Consequently, though real estate agents might otherwise appear to 
operate establishments of public accommodation,23 it would probably 
constitute an unwarranted extension of the law to apply it to them as 
an indirect assault on discrimination in the field of permanent hous-
ing. It is significant that the Commission's Report which was distrib-
uted to all the legislators and which occasioned the new legislation 
did not include a survey of permanent housing or real estate agency 
practices although it did include a survey of trailer court practices.24 
Although the legislature has not expressly provided that dis-
tinctly private facilities are exempt from the law, such an exemption 
may be inferred in that the law is limited to "place(s) of public ac-
commodation." The problem is, however, to acknowledge the legiti-
macy of certain interests in exclusive association which renders a 
place distinctly private, without at the same time swallowing up the rule 
that there shall be no discrimination in places of public accommoda-
tion. In certain respects, the same tests which Professor Horowitz 
has applied to determine which kinds of business establishments fall 
outside the law also apply to this private club problem, but with this 
clarification: the facility may be one which ordinarily constitutes a 
place of public accommodation, e.g., a golf course, but it may still 
operate in such a fashion that it should nonetheless be classified as 
"private" so as to vindicate the associational interests of its "mem-
bers." Manifestly, it is impossible to determine the scope of the pri-
vate club exemption by listing types of facilities, for the legitimate 
exclusiveness of such clubs is more a function of their internal order 
than of the activity which they sponsor. An inn is most conspicuously 
23 Cj. Cal. Att'y Gen. Ops., 5 Race Rei. L. Rep. 255 (1960), 6 Race Rei. L. Rep. 
354-55 (1961); Mass. Att'y Gen. Op., Nov. 24, 1959, 5 Race Rei. L. Rep. 253 (1960). 
24 See supra note 4. See also Teverbaugh v. El Key Trailer Parks, 3 Race Rei. L. 
Rep. 222 (Cal. Super. Ct. 1958). 
0 
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a place of public accommodation, and yet an inn operated exclusively 
by and for dues-paying members of the Upper Peninsula Bridge Club 
ought not necessarily have to cater to the world at large. And if the 
Bridge Club should employ religion or racial qualifications in the 
selections of its members, we may respect the desire of the members 
to assert these associational preferences in a relatively harmless way, 
even though we may take personal exception to the values reflected 
by those preferences. At the same time, clearly not every establish-
ment using the "club" label merits a special exemption.25 Particular 
cases might best be resolved with the Commission taking evidence 
on the following questions: 
1. Do the "club members" participate hi the organizations' 
policy decisions, or do they merely accede to membership 
qualifications established by an independent manager, owner 
or nucleus of members?26 
2. Is the organization a nonprofit association supported by reg-
ular dues and initiation fees, or is it essentially a commercial 
establishment operated for profit, with short-term member-
ship cards functionally resembling tickets?27 
3. Is it clear that the organization is sustained principally by 
the associational interests of its members in one another, or 
does it exist principally from the coincidence of interest in 
the activity of its sponsors?28 
2u Mich. Att'y Gen. Op., 2 Race Rei. L. Rep. 1046, 1049 (1957). 
26 See the only Ohio case to e."tamine the private club device, Gillespie v. Lake Shore 
Golf Club, Inc., 56 Ohio L. Abs. 222, 91 N.E.2d 290 (Ct. App. 1950), infra note 26. 
27 Id. See Crawford v. Kent, 167 N.E.2d 620, 5 Race Rei. L. Rep. 830 (Mass. 
S. Ct. 1960), holding a dancing school to be a place of public accommodation partly 
because it was a "commercial enterprise," a "business operated for profit"; Peoples v. 
Club Primadonna, 5 Race Rei. L. Rep. 1164 (Cal. Super. Ct. 1960), awarding $500 
exemplary and $100 actual damages to a Negro and against a subsidiary of a Nevada 
"Club" in business in California to sell "reservations to the general public" for tours to 
the Nevada club; SCAD v. Trowbridge, 5 Race Rei. L. Rep. 552 (1960), holding that 
Trowbridge Farm, advertising in N.Y. papers for "Christian clientele," with facilities for 
dining and recreation, operated for profit by a family proprietorship, was a place of 
public accommodation. And see Evans v. Ross, 150 A.2d 512 (Camden Cty. Ct. N.J.), 
4 Race Rei. L. Rep. 355 (1959), aff'd 154 A.2d 441 (N.J. Super. Ct.), 4 Race Rei. L. 
Rep. 1012 (1959), cert. denied, 157 A.2d 362 (N.J. Super. Ct. 1959), 5 Race Rei. L. Rep. 
206 (1960). 
28 See supra notes 25-27, and see Castle Hill Beach Club v. Arbury, 208 Misc. 35, 
142 N.Y.S.2d 432 (1955), denying a private club exemption where the club had 7,500 
adult members, admitted 10,000 annually as guests of members, operated on 16 acres 
with 3,780 bathhouses, 2 swimming pools, 32 handball courts, and 10 tennis courts, where 
voting rights were confined to sb: permanent members and regular members had no 
authority to influence the club's policy. See also Norman v. City Island Beach Co., 
126 Misc. 335, 213 N.Y. Supp. 379 (1926), exemption denied to swimming club with 
lockers for 1,500 and members used only 60 at a time, and the club generally solicited 
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a) How many members are there? 
b) How frequent is the turnover in membership? 
c) How frequently do the members use the facilities? 
d) How many and how regular are the meetings? 
e) Is the activity one involving fairly intimate association, 
or one with but casual relations between groups? 
f) To what extent are those who use the facilities actually 
acquainted with one another? 
Because of the untested discretionary powers reposed in the Civil 
Rights Commission, it is premature to pass judgement on the success 
of Ohio's newest effort in the field of civil rights. Nevertheless, the 
legislature's act is relatively bold in comparison with developments 
in other jurisdictions.29 It comes as a vigorous reminder that "a State 
may choose to put its authority behind one of the cherished aims of 
American feeling by forbidding indulgence in racial or religious prej-
udice to another's hurt."30 
members from the public at large; McCarter v. Beckwith, 247 App. Div. 289, 285 N.Y. 
Supp. 151 (1936), aff'd 272 N.Y. 488, 3 N.E.2d 882, cert. denied, 299 U.S. 601 (1936); 
Everett v. Harron, 380 Pa. 123, 110 A.2d 383 (1955). 
29 See supra note 11. 
30 Railway Mail Ass'n v. Coral, 326 U.S. 88, 98 (1945) (Frankfurter, J. concurring). 
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